17 research outputs found
Objective versus Subjective Performance Evaluations
Why does incentive pay often depend on subjective rather than objective performance evaluations? After all, subjective evaluations entail a credibility issue. While the most plausible explanation for this practice is lack of adequate objective measures, I argue that subjective evaluations might sometimes also be used to withhold information from the worker. I furthermore argue that withholding information is particularly important under circumstances where the credibility issue is small. The statements are derived from a two-stage principal-agent model in which the stochastic relationship between effort and performance is unknown
Randomization in contracts with endogenous information
I consider a situation, where the agent can acquire payoff-relevant information either before or after the contract is signed. To raise efficiency, the principal might solicit information; to retain all surplus, however, she must prevent precontractual information gathering. The following class of stochastic contracts may solve this trade-off optimally: before signing, information acquisition is not solicited, and afterwards randomly. The key insight is that randomization makes precontractual information costlier for the agent.Information acquisition, Principal-agent, Mechanism design, Randomization
Experiments versus distributions of posteriors
A fundamental result in Bayesian persuasion and information design states that a distribution of posterior beliefs can be induced by an experiment if and only if the posterior beliefs average to the prior belief. We present a general version of this result that applies to infinite state and signal spaces
Precontractual Investigation and Sequential Screening
Should contract design induce an agent to conduct a precontractual investigation even though, in any case, the agent will become fully informed after the signing of the contract? This paper shows that imperfect investigations might be encouraged. The result stands in contrast to previous studies, which focus on perfect investigations. The contrast exists because if precontractual investigation is perfect, the benefits of sequential screening vanish
Private versus verifiable interim performance evaluations under uncertainty
I study the trade-off between private and verifiable interim performance evaluations under uncertainty. More uncertainty leads to higher agency costs if the interim evaluation is public and verifiable but lower agency costs if the interim evaluation is private and unverifiable
On information acquisition by buyers and information disclosure by sellers
I consider a monopolistic-pricing model in which the buyer does not know his valuation at the outset. The seller may induce him to acquire information even though she could easily disclose sufficient information herself